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decenter self, decenter ethics, and decenter society, thus giving rise to conflict, 
potential violence, and despair in society. Here Thiselton argues that the 
postmodern self, however, stands closer to biblical realism than the illusory 
optimism of modernity's self about human nature and society (130). Postmodern 
self can find hope, though, only in the context of a biblical theology of promise. 
In the context of promise, a new horizon is formed in which the postmodern self, 
which has "a constructed identity," can be "reconstituted." 
For Thiselton, acting in the present on the basis of that which is yet to come 
constitutes a faith that has self-transforming effects. It transforms the self because 
it "reconstitutes self-identity" as no longer the passive victim of forces of the past 
which "situatedn it within a network of pregiven roles and performances, but 
opens out a new future in which new purpose brings a "point" to its life. " 
The self perceives a call and its value as one-who-is-loved within the larger 
narrative plot of God's loving purposes for the world, for society, and for the self" 
(160). The "image of Christ" assumes a fundamental role in relation to future 
promise. To be transformed into "the image of Christn and to become "like him" 
constitute the heart of the divine promise which lifts the self out of its predefined 
situatedness and beckons from "beyondn to a new future (153). 
This creative transformation comes through the Holy Spirit, who transposes 
self-interest into love for others and for the Other (154). The personhood of God- 
as-Trinity provides the framework for a dialectic of self-identity and relation to the 
"other." In spite of the excellent ideas in this section, Thiselton's theological 
development of promise, Holy Spirit, and the personhood of Trinity proves rather 
vague in comparison to the indepth, philosophical discussions of earlier sections. 
His lack of specificity here, unfortunately, is in keeping with much of the current 
dialogue on either of these issues, and again reflects an existentialism and neo- 
orthodox perspective of Scripture. At the most, in his own terms, he reaches 
"toward a theology of promise." This is a significant discussion on the post- 
modern understanding of self, but the solutions it advances, while in principle 
correct, need more biblical structure and concreteness. 
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As an example of doctrine-as-explanation (in contrast to, say, doctrine-as- 
Thomas Torrance's The Christian Doctrine of God, One Being, Three 
Pmons is a tour de force. Torrance, who is professor emeritus at the University 
of Edinburgh, is concerned that the Protestant doctrine of God no longer succumb 
to the tendency to wrongly conceive God's tri-unity first in terms of the divine 
essence and only s~bsequently in terms of the divine Persons (112). Torrance offers 
a two-fold conception of divine Being, as personal and perichoretic, to make this 
corrective. 
Torrance begins with the insistence that the evangelical, or economic, trinity 
is identical with the immanent, or ontological, trinity (133). Thus, following Karl 
Barth, the revelation of God in Christ as Revealer, Revelation, and Revealedness 
factually indicates the same triadic ratio that characterizes God's intrinsic Being 
(32). The difficulty here, of course, is to avoid simply reproducing the tritheism 
that seems implicit in all Platonic formulations of the Trinity, in which otrsia 
relates to hypostasis as universal to particular. However, Torrance claims to have 
unearthed an "onto-personaln conception of Being, which escapes tritheism, in the 
line of thought that stretches from Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria to 
Epiphanius and Gregory of Nazianzus. While earlier patristic doctrine treated 
hypostasis (a relational term) as synonymous with ousia (a static term), subsequent 
thinkers beginning with Athanasius conceived the "ontic relationsn between the 
divine Persons as belonging to what they are as Persons (156-157). Torrance 
concludes, "The relations between the divine Persons are not just modes of 
existence but hypostatic interrelations which belong intrinsically to what Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit are coinherently in themselves and in their mutual objective 
relations with and for one another. These relations subsisting between them are 
just as substantial as what they are unchangeably in themselves and by themselvesn 
(157). The upshot of this bit of conceptual archeology lies in Torrance's conclusion 
that God's Being is not static and impersonal (as Greek philosophy demanded) but 
penoml: God's Being cannot but be spoken of in the same breath as God's triadic 
Personality, and vice versa (128). 
Torrance's second corrective to the doctrine of the Trinity is an emphasis on 
the soteriological necessity of God's perichoresis. The form of Athanasius's 
christological argument (namely, that the efficacy of salvation hangs upon the full 
divinity of the Son), applies simultaneously to the Father and the Spirit. Thus, 
"unless the Being and Activity of the Spirit are identical with the Being and 
Activity of the Father and the Son, we are not savedn (169). The mutual 
coinherence of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit excludes any consideration that "some 
attributes and activities common to the whole Trinity may be specially assigned 
or 'appropriated' to one Person rather than another in order to reveal his 
distinctive hypostatic charactern (200). Rather, each Person of the Godhead is the 
onto-relational source (which is not to say the causal or temporal origin) of 
qualities that apply uniformly to the whole. For example, the Holy Spirit is the 
onto-relational source for the "spiritnessn of the Godhead by which God as a whole 
imbues creation with life, or spiritual power. God as a whole acts as spirit toward 
creation just as God as a whole acts as father toward creation. In this way God's 
activity outside the Godhead is not only indivisible (opera trinitatis ad extra sunt 
indivisa); it is an important analogy to intra-trinitarian relations (140,215,218-220, 
243). 
Torrance provides his theses with strong historical support derived mainly 
from a careful exegesis of Athanasius's writings. Torrance's approach is historical 
in a second way as well. Like his forebear Barth, Torrance aspires to an 
intentionally "circular" methodological holism (3, or "depth exegesisn (37-5O), that 
aims to avoid grounding theology on any nontheological source. In his eyes, 
revelation provides its own frame of reference for intelligibility (43). That is to say, 
there is no basis for knowledge of God prior to that knowledge of God. This 
implies, first, that one's character must be adequated by God's Spirit to the task 
of theology (11,34,61-62,83,88,99-100,106,127). Only such a person can attain 
to the "mystery of godliness," which Torrance identifies as the ability to think in 
a trinitarian way (74). But, second, this means that just as God cannot be analyzed 
into parts (simplicitas Dez), so too knowledge of God is of a piece; each Person of 
the Godhead, being internally related to the others, can be known only to the 
extent one understands the other two, and thus to the extent one understands the 
whole (174). In this sense the Trinity can be likened to the three-dimensional 
image which emerges from a stereoscope: only by simultaneous focus on each of 
the similar, but necessarily dzferent, pictures can the accurate image of the whole 
be perceived (47). 
The difficult task of mastering this difficult book is made more onerous by 
the persistence of a number of problems throughout. For example, after 
establishing that intra-trinitarian relations belong to the nature of each Person and 
thus to the Being of the whole Godhead (surely a form of idealism), it becomes 
very difficult to imagine on what grounds Torrance can assert that the relations 
of God ad extra do not belong to God's nature. In other words, how can it be that 
Pentecost manifested a change in God's relations with creation, but not a change 
in God's "nature" (238)? This inconsistency renders ambiguous the cash value of 
his notion of "onto-personal" Being. 
However, a more glaring difficulty, it seems to me, is the lack of nuance in 
Torrance's theological use of language. First, Torrance claims that "theological 
concepts are used aright when we do not think the concepts themselves, thereby 
identifying them with the truth, but think through them of the realities or truths 
which they are meant to intend beyond themselves" (194). But how can we ever 
be certain we are getting things right? On the presupposition that the Holy Spirit 
compels an adequate transformation of an individual's consciousness (34, 61-62)? 
Perhaps. On the grounds that there must be an amlogia relationis between God's 
dealings with creation and his intra-trinitarian relations (243)? Maybe. But these 
ways of putting the matter turn the clock backwards to the early twentieth 
century, when conservatives debated liberals over the mechanism of theological 
language; a debate, incidentally, that was never satisfactorily settled in these terms 
and, moreover, that   re dated Barth's own thoughts on the matter. 
Second, and even more troubling to this reviewer, is Torrance's inattention 
to the irreducibly social character of theological language and belief. Nowhere 
does Torrance discuss the role that participation in the believing community's 
corporate life plays in understanding claims about God. So Torrance cites the 
apostle Thomas's ascription of lordship to Jesus as if that were intelligible apart 
from the political context in which it was written. But early readers of John's 
Gospel would not naturally hear "my Lord and my God" as an ontological claim 
about the identity of Jesus Christ with Yahweh (51-53). Rather, they would 
recognize in these words the very Dominus etDars noster that Domitian demanded 
be rendered unto him! Thus Thomas's claim is none other than a declaration of 
allegiance to a new, and in Rome's eyes subversive, polis called the church. 
Similarly, it may have been more fruitful for Torrance to consider perichoresis as 
agrammatical remark that gets its sense from the social solidarity that constitutes 
the Body of Christ than as a meta-scientific term that purportedly explains God's 
intrinsically trinitarian nature (88-1 11). Sadly, Torrance appears unable to suggest 
any way in which the church is the foundation of doctrinal truth (1 Tim. 3: 15), not 
the other way around. 
Torrance may very well be correct that contemporary Western theology 
lacks the conceptual resources for correctly conceiving God. But it is not clear that 
such resources can be supplied by a meticulous explanation of ancient vocabulary 
that does not attend to the communal form of life which gave this vocabulary its 
original sense. In the end, Torrance may simply have invented a new language 
(using old words), the language of onto-penonality and perichoresis, which is 
grounded in contemporary scientific culture rather than in the praxis of first- 
century faith. The question remains, therefore, whether fluency in this language 
ought to be   referred over the biblical declaration, "My Lord and my God." 
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